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1 INTRODUCTION 
Possibly a million people died in Rwanda in the genocide of 1994, Many 
others have been killed subsequently, largely because the tragedy remains 
unresolved in terms of both truth and justice (Sarkin 1999:767) The 
victims of the genocide were mostly Tutsis, although Hutus who had 
demonstrated support for power sharing in government between Tutsis 
and Hutus were also 
A critical issue facing Rwanda is the present state of the criminal justice 
system. Around 125 000 people accused of participating in the genocide 
I This paper was written in J 998 for the NGO Relationships Foundation also called the 
Newick Park Initiative (NP1) for its ongoing work in Rwanda, It was presented to the 
of Rwanda in J 998 which subsequently announced that the Gacaca would 
brought into the Justice in [he year 2000, While the government of Rwanda 
releaseel ils model at the of j 999, using the Gacaca structures to deal only with is-
sues between 1990 and 1994, [[leir model is highly problematic to say the least. This 
paper does nor examine the government's model. but rather places on record the 
gestions given to the government of Rwanda, This draws from another 
ground paper on the history of the use of the Gacaca for NPI by Mary Taylor. 
An examination of the Rwandan government's Gacaca model is to be published as 
Sarkin forthcoming 2000, 
2 See Amnesty International J 995 and Zaremba J 997 Reports differ significantly as to 
the actual number of killed. Estimates range from 500000 to one million, Most 
media repons estimate number to be closer to 500 000 while international NGOs 
which have been to Rwanda [Q investigate estimate the number is closer to one mil-
lion, Zaremba eswnates there were 800 000 deaths, 
3 See, for example. Amnesty International 1994. While the independent CommiSSion 01 
Experts commissioned in terms of Security Council Resolution 935 (1994) found that 
the Tutsis had not perpetrated any acts which would fail within the definition of trle 
Genocide Convention. a repon drawn up for the High Commissioners of Refugees ac-
cused the Rwanda Patriotic Front of summarily killing 30 000 Hutus between June and 
September 1994, See UN document 5/1994/1125: Letter Boutros Boutros-Gali 
October 7 1994 Preliminary Report of the Independent of Experts in ac-
cordance with SecurIty Council Resolution 935 (1994) par 148, Des Milliers de Hutlls 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
are in prison. Some of them have been held for up to three years without 
trial. No judicial system anywhere in the world was designed to handle 
the stress presented by an attempt to prosecute over 100 000 people 
accused of committing crimes. Rwanda's system in particular does not 
have the capability to handle these demands. Some mechanism to aid the 
criminal justice system is of vital significance. 
Steps have to be taken in Rwanda to deal with the many other prob-
lems that continue as a legacy of the genocide. Dealing with the pain and 
suffering of the victims on the one hand and with large prison numbers 
and problematic prison conditions on the other are both essential. The 
government has begun to consider options to alleviate the situation and 
reduce the numbers in detention. One possibility being investigated is the 
involvement of local communities in the justice system. 
2 A TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION 
A proposal that might playa role in dealing with the issue in Rwanda is the 
idea of a truth and reconciliation commission. These institutions create a 
record of human rights abuses that is as complete as possible. including the 
nature and extent of the crimes and a Full record of the names and fates of 
the victims. Some such commissions have covered very short periods while 
others have covered much longer but still well-defined periods.' A truth and 
reconciliation commission can be set up in a variety of ways, Tailoring the 
commission's mandate and powers to both the country's current situation 
as well as its history provides the best chance for success.' 
Although Rwanda presents many daunting challenges for a truth and 
reconciliation commission. or any other process that would pro,mote 
unification and tOlerance. it is appropriate for a number of reasons,' 
4 In fact, as of 1996, two years after the killings occurred. only a very few of the 
accused had given hearings (Q determine if there was sufficient evidence to hold 
them, and none had been tried. See McKinley 1996, The first trial under the auspices 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda did not take place until 10 January 
1997. two and a half years after the events at issue. See HranJski 1997, At the time of 
the first trial. only 21 others been indicted under the tribunal and of these, only 13 
were in cusrody. See Turner 1997. 
5 See generally Sarkin 1996. 
6 The high profile investigation by the Organisation of African Unity into the causes of the 
1994 genocide in Rwanda and its effects on Africa's Great Lakes Region announced at the 
beginning of June 1998 could also assist in the healing process in Rwanda as well as in 
mher countries of the region. The Secretary-General of the OAU said the inquiry would not 
be a criminal investigation nor would it run counter to the work being done by Rwandan 
courtS and the International Criminal Coun on Rwanda in Arusha, Tanzania and that a 
fund had been created to support its work, See Electronic Mail and Guardian June 
1998 at http://wwwwoza,coza/africa/genocide,htmL 
7 Schabas 1996: 559 notes that "Rwanda has rejected, .. a [ruth commission. The idea 
of having a truth commission has, however. been explored by the Rwandan Govern-
ment. Thus. a large delegation of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commis-
sion went to Rwanda in October 1996 and met with government officials. Rwandan 
offiCials then went to South Africa (Q visit the TRC in January 1997, However, the 
Rwandans commented that reconciliation would be nice but [hat they preferred justice 
and reconciliation could wait". The Minister of Transport also commented "we don't 










































Firstly, the ongoing animosity and retributive violence between the cur-
rent and former governments and their respective followers is evidence 
that the status quo is not working. While the violence has been reduced in 
the recent past, if a new method for addressing the problems is not im-
plemented. the violence will continue. 
Secondly. the Rwandan government is not equipped to channel all re-
sponsible parties through the traditional legal system.' Thus far. attempts 
to do so have led to increased human rights violations, anger, and distrust 
of the system among both victims and accused.' Even if the system could 
accommodate the tremendous number of accused, it does not provide 
victims with a means of telling their stories and venting their hostilities in 
a controlled and non-violent manner. They are not participants in the 
process and therefore do not receive the kind of psychological benefits 
achieved by a truth and reconciliation commission. 
Additionally. a truth and reconciliation commission can facilitate a na-
tional catharsis (Sarkin 1998). Should the commission be successful in its 
work. future generations will be served by the knowledge that the record 
of past abuses is as complete as it can be. Such a record should include 
the nature and extent of the crimes committed, the names and fates of 
the victims, and the identities of those who gave the orders and those who 
executed them. The hope is that such a record, in combination with the 
recommendations made by the commission, will ensure the avoidance of 
such human rights violations in the future and will also further the devel-
opment of a human rights culture. 
A properly-constituted commission would generate public awareness of 
what really happened. This is necessary to counter the extensive propa-
ganda being circulated by the displaced Hutu leadership that denies the 
genOcide and places the blame for all past violence on the genOcide 
victims." This has led to further anger and resentment on the part of the 
victims and to an entrenched belief among the perpetrators that they truly 
were acting in self-defence. Government tactics also assist in confirming 
the perceptions of perpetrators who believe that they were not the instiga-
tors of the violence. The benefit of this would allow forums in many 
communities all over Rwanda to come together and hear testimony about 
events during the genOcide. Survivors would be able to tell their stories to 
their communities and thereby have an opportunity to restore their dig-
nity and self worth. 
In the absence of the processes envisaged in the workings of a truth and 
reconciliation commission, anger, resentment, hatred, and tend 
to be the order of the day. [f the future is to offer an improvement on the 
past, there must be both a conscious and a continuing rejection of the 
crimes committed and the ideology that justified them. In the case of 
8 See Reis 1997: 648 and Cousineau 1996. 
9 See Reis 1997: 648. 
10 S{,e Zalaquett ! 989. 
1 1 See Human Rights Walch 1994. Amongst the HutLI the view that is held is that there 
was no genocide but rather killings by both sides in the context of a war and tilat there 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
Rwanda, the current tendency of the Hutus to deny the genocide while at 
the same time justifying their actions on the basis of their own perceived 
or feared losses (of property, prestige, position, security, self-esteem and 
so on) will continue, and they will mourn only for themselves. Such a mindset 
makes true reconciliation all but impossible. Only by publicly and collec-
tively acknowledging the horror of past human rights violations is it possi-
ble for a country to establish the rule of law and a culture of human rights. 
Should a truth and reconciliation commission be established, victims 
across the spectrum will have a credible and legitimate forum through 
which to reclaim their human worth and dignity; perpetrators, irrespective 
of persuasion and motivation, will have a channel through which to expi-
ate their gUilt. "The confession itself, irrespective of any eventual ~riminal 
sanction, is seen as an important source of justice for victims" (Schabas 
1996:537) Failure to establish this kind of process disregards the rights 
and views of victims, denies the need for a healing process, prevents 
recovery of the past. imagines that forgiveness can take place without full 
knowledge of whom and what to forgive, and fails to establish human 
rights values as the core standard for the future. 
In Rwanda resentment and hostility are still prevailing sentiments. A 
truth and reconciliation commiSSion could develop a complete picture of 
the causes, nature, and extent of gross violations of human rights and, 
importantly, make this known. It could also provide a mechanism that 
would facilitate confession of crimes and ease the pressures on the weak 
criminal justice system. If the route of granting amnesty is chosen, it can 
assist in this process or suggest sentences for persons who make full 
disclosure of all the relevant facts relating to acts associated with a politi-
cal objective. Such a truth and reconciliation commission should establish 
and make known the fate or whereabouts of victims and restore the 
human and Civil dignity of survivors of abuse by granting them an oppor-
tunity to relate their own accounts of the violations they suffered. By 
recognising and publicising the victim's story, the inherent worth and 
dignity of the person is acknowledged. In addition, the commission can 
recommend such reparation measures as are possible in the circumstances. 
A commission can also compile a public report detailing its activities 
and findings and recommend measures to prevent future violations of 
human rights. Several positive consequences would flow from this. First, it 
would deter new governmental authorities from committing abuses 
themselves because they will have to follow the rule of law as there will be 
greater scrutiny and accountability. It would demystify the past and 
expose the previous regime's brutality and its inability to govern fairly. It 
would imbue the new government with respectability because, especially 
by prosecuting the planners of the genOCide, it would be sending the clear 
message that no one is above the law, and that ethical values may not be 
discarded in the name of a political goal. Finally, it would legitimise the 
new government's actions because it upholds the rule of law. 
A possible danger. and something that should be anticipated and proac-
tively addressed, is the fact that a truth and reconciliation commission 
holds the potential of opening up old wounds, renewing resentment and 










































PRECONDITIONS AND PROCESSES FOR ESTABLlSHING A TRe IN RWANDA 
and preparation is crucial to ensure that the process achieves its aims and 
objectives. If this is not done. revenge and retaliation killings might result. 
3 A Gacaca Truth, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Enquiry 
(GTRRE) 
Although a national truth and reconciliation commission is a necessity. the 
government of Rwanda believes that such a commission is not a feasible 
option at the present time for a number of reasons. One reason is that the 
process should begin at local level to bring these communities together. 
The war occurring in the region involving Rwanda and Congo is another 
reason why such prospects are remote. In addition. the Rwandan 
ernment, which would have to establish and support such a process. 
seems to be unwilling to do so at present, The main reason for this reluc-
tance to have a national process seems to be more for political reasons 
than any other. Failing to have such a process will almost definitely have 
major long term negative effects for individual and group relations, 
It is possible that the Gacaca, a traditional community-based mecha-
nism. could be used as an interim measure at local level to ease some of 
the pressures and problems that face Rwanda in the immediate future. 
This must. however, be seen to be short-term. interim solution being a 
prelude to a national truth and reconciliation process, It is critical that in 
the not too distant future a national truth and reconciliation process is be 
established. otherwise the spiral of ethnic violence will continue to remain 
a feature of the Rwandan landscape," 
The Gacaca has a dispute resolution focus and derives its name from its 
meaning 'lawn' that is. referring to the fact that members of the Gacaca sit 
on the grass when listening to and considering matters before them. The 
Gacaca, similar to nearly all systems of traditional law, is contingent upon 
culture. It is established upon principles of morality and reverence of life. 
As such it cannot be examined in a detached way but has to be examined 
in the context of the society it forms part of. Taking the context into 
account is crucial given the changes that have occurred since the genocide 
in Rwanda. As a result of the killings and population movements that have 
occurred. Rwandan society has fundamentally changed and changes to 
the family and family relationships have also occurred. This has resulted in 
changes in the use of the Gacaca and the role these structures play. The 
system is still uncomplicated. but families approach the Gacaca less fre-
quently and people tend to prefer using the state courts. 
In the past the Gacaca has considered issues around marriage. divorce. 
succession, parental authority, injury, and land disputes, One of its major 
purposes was to re-establish order in a community, However, it did nor 
deal with murder, and certainly not ethnically-motivated murder. Allowing 
the Gacaca to change its role to move into dealing with issues such as 
murder, as well as rehabilitation, reconstruction and reconciliation after 
the genocide, could be outside of what it could manage, In addition, many 
of the people who have returned to Rwanda after living outside the country 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
for many years have no experience with the Gacaca, It may be possible to 
remedy this with training, but the need for skills would be enormous, An 
enormous benefit of a local-level Gacaca is that language is generally not a 
problem. 
The Gacaca has been operating in a few communities since the 
dde, It involves the community in the process of dispute resolution, making 
the process community-based, It acts as a local healing and dispute resolu-
tion mechanism that is cheap and accessible, In general where these 
structures operate, people have some degree of confidence in the system 
as they see respected community figures serving on the Gacaca and are 
able to observe the proceedings without leaving the areas where they live, 
The name of the Gacaca should be changed for the purpose of dealing 
with the legacy of the genocide. This name change would designate 
specific functions. aims and objectives, It may be useful to use the term 
Gacaca Truth, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Enquiry (GTRRE), It may 
even be useful to include the term 'reconciliation' in the name, This may 
be controversial in Rwanda but the benefits of its inclusion would be 
enormous, It would help to instill confidence in members of the commu-
nity who feared such a process that the exercise would be beneficial in the 
long term, It would also help to ensure that the process is free of revenge, 
animosity and bitterness, The focus of the Gacaca would also be to reduce 
these feelings in order to allow neighbours to coexist in peace, While it 
would be useful to use the Gacaca in all communities in Rwanda for this 
process, the problems in setting them up allover the country immediately 
and in a proper, orderly fashion will be enormous. It therefore makes 
sense to establish two or three pilot Gacaca to test the process, If these are 
successful, the government could allow an increasing number of com-
munes or secteur's to have Gacaca, Eventually the system could be ex-
panded to all parts of the country, possibly over a five-year period, It 
would probably be wise to allow the system to expand slowly to aVOid 
problems, 
Customarily the Gacaca were composed of older men who were re-
spected in their communities, Their role was to impart justice impartially, 
with sincerity, wisely, honestly, and freely without benefiting themselves. 
However, it may be that the GTRRE might need to be composed of all 
members of the community, men and women, Hutu and Tutsi, to ensure 
that its process would encompass all issues and so that certain groups of 
people would not feel marginalised, For the process to work, how people 
were placed onto the GTRRE would be a critical factor. Unless everyone as 
in a particular community bought into the process, the work of the struc-
ture would be doomed from the outset. To overcome the fears of survi-
vors, any application to establish a GTRRE must show that all groups in 
the cellule agree to apply, Victims of the genOCide expressed fears at 
workshops in Rwanda that the use of the Gacaca could lead to arbitrary 
and summary justice, If a precondition of establishing a GTRRE is that all 
groups in the community must agree to apply, this will encourage local 
bargaining and discussion about the choice of people to serve on it. To 
facilitate the agreement of local groups to apply for a GTRRE, there may 










































PRECONDITIONS AND PROCESSES FOR ESTABLISHING A TRe IN RWANDA 
and widowers who feel they have nothing to gain from co-operating. This 
would also be an important aspect of the preparation programme. 
Mechanisms need to be found to ensure that both Hutus and Tutsis sit on 
the GTRRE. Membership should not be appointed, and people should be 
encouraged to participate. It is critical to the effectiveness of a GTRRE that it 
is seen to be fair and unbiased. Individuals who serve on it must command 
the respect and support of the people and all who appear before it. 
Government should provide space, assistance and encouragement for 
the GTRRE. This will make the local population less suspicious and give 
the people a greater sense of ownership, If the government is seen to be 
imposing these structures on communities, this will have a highly negative 
effect on the mission and the process will be seen to be a witch hunt, 
rather than something suited to everyone's needs. The government should 
set out terms of reference, which should be as inclusive as possible, and 
procedures that allow secteurs or ce[[ules in Rwanda to establish local 
GTRRE structures, The desire of the survivors to get the truth, and the 
desire of prisoners and their Families to speed up the process of justice, 
would lead communities to apply, 
The benefits of the process to all must be advertised and promoted, 
While truth would be a major goal, the opportunity to promote reconcilia-
tion should not be lost. Bringing together a community where rifts exist 
should not be undertaken without ensuring that a process to heal those 
rifts is in place. The aims and goals of the GTRRE need to be fully dis-
cussed and accepted, On the one hand, it is useful to bring local commu-
nities in on the process of justice to alleviate some of the difficulties facing 
the formal legal system However, it must be clear that certain activities of 
perpetrators like those of the organisers of the genocide should not be 
placed before the GTRRE, These individuals should still be prosecuted in 
the courts to ensure accountability and the rule of law, It is critical that the 
courts trying these people should be above reproach and be perceived as 
fair and independent. Whether these trials occur inside or outside Rwanda 
should depend on the ability of the courts to achieve the independence 
and neutrality, GTRRE structures should be able to hear everything con-
cerning people who appear before them, and should be able to hear 
testimonies both from victims and perpetrators, The exercise should aim 
to arrive at an understanding about what happened and why things were 
done, An additional component could be some very low level of compen-
sation, although this could cause complications for the process and see it 
have a financial focus, 
Part of the exercise must be to ensure that perpetrators feel confident 
that this is a fair, impartial process, and they will be dealt with and treated 
fairly. Members of the GTRRE structures must therefore be fair in carrying 
out their mandate. Also, the method by which people are appointed, or 
elected, or to the GTRRE must be seen by all to be inclusive and fair. If the 
GTRRE is viewed as a government-established and government-run struc-
ture, or one staffed by people who do not instill confidence in all the 
people, especially those who may appear before it. the process will be 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
The manner in which people are dealt with by the GTRRE will also be 
crucial in determining whether the process is successful. It will also be 
necessary to attempt (0 educate the communities where GTRRE structures 
are to be set up about the benefits of a process conducted with dignity; the 
way preconceived notions and beliefs about people who appear before the 
GTRRE could undermine its work; and how the process will take place. 
This will help to avoid the jeering and booing which has occurred in the 
courts when alleged genocide perpetrators are on triaL 
GTRRE stuctures should not be permined to sanction people by way of 
imprisonment or other types of physical sanction. As far as possible. the 
process ought to attempt to get consensus and hand down punishments 
that are accepted by all and which serve to heal the community. Fines or 
community service could be useful in achieving that goal. Services that 
can rebuild community activities or infrastructure will lead to positive 
results. It is necessary that punishments imposed are not seen to be the 
imposition of sanctions by victors on the vanquished. The GTRRE will also 
have to deal with ancillary items such as land appropriation and the 
numerous complaints about the possession or occupation of land by 
returnees and others. 
3.1 Whose commission? 
It is. of course. vital that such a process is credible and legitimate. Other-
wise it will not be accepted by all parties and whatever result it arrives at 
will be questioned. In other words. it is crucial to ensure that the commis-
sion has political legitimacy, In the absence of such legitimacy, whatever 
record of past human rights abuses the commission produces will be 
contested and reconciliation will remain a vain hope. 
No model is ideal for all purposes and no model can be transplanted 
from one situation to another, particularly in view of the cultural, histori-
caL political and other differences across the world. However. it is obvi-
ously useful to attempt to learn from the experiences of other countries 
and to adapt their models to fit specific circumstances. 
Various key factors have to be considered when establishing a process. 
For example. the choice of the time period over which human rights viola-
tions are to be examined will often determine the acceptability of the proc-
ess. In order to promote reconciliation it is vital to ensure that the process 
has political legitimacy. If the GTRRE has the power to sentencing, it 
is vital that proceedings are characterised by due process so that those who 
appear before it are given sufficient legal advice and assistance. 
One cannot take a truth issue forward without addressing the wider 
political context. The question is: how does one produce a process that 
also moves toward national reconciliation? 
3.2 Legitimacy 
It is vital (0 the success of the project that all sectors of the population buy 
into the process. If the process is not seen as independent of the govern-
ment it will affect the objectivity of the process. at least in the perception 










































PRECONDITIONS AND PROCESSES FOR ESTABLISHING A TRC IN RWANDA 
If such a process is to enjoy legitimacy and fulfil its function of enabling 
reconstruction. rehabilitation and reconciliation, its establishment must be 
inFormed by an understanding of the particularities of the history and 
transition of the country within which it is to operate. The extent to which 
a process is established by the new order. in co-operation with those who 
were vanquished. plays an important part in determining whether such a 
process can assist in national reconciliation. On the other hand, the extent 
of the involvement of the vanquished perpetrators also has a on 
the acceptance of that institution by those who suffered human rights 
abuses. Great sensitivity is called for in this regard. 
Even though there cannot be one final "objective truth", it is critical that 
the version of "the truth" arrived at by the commission embraces the 
of all. Unless the people feel that they have been a part of the 
process of decision making. they will doubt the integrity and motivations 
of those setting up the commission and those involved in its processes. 
Legitimacy for a commission means that the process is accepted as an 
objective body capable of finding an unbiased "truth". This perception is 
generally achieved by having a well-balanced commission of highly re-
spected people. A process is perceived to be well-balanced when the 
individuals serving on it are from a variety of ethnic and political back-
grounds and constituencies. The key to legitimacy is that the enqUiry must 
not only be unbiased and nonpartisan in but it must also be per-
ceived as such by the Rwandan population as a whole. 
To attain legitimacy. an enqUiry must be an officially designated 
non-partisan entity." This means that the process cannot be controlled or 
influenced by the government or even appear to be under the govern-
ment's control or influence. To ensure that this is the case. the very crea· 
tion and setup of the process must be unbiased and, most importantly, 
perceived as such by the country's nationals. 
3.3 Establishment of the GTRRE and appointment of members 
Who appoints the members of the enquiry is crucial. If the government 
appoints the members many will feel that it is not sufficiently independent 
to arrive at a version of the truth with which they will be satisfied. Thus, a 
neutral process is critical to ensure that those who serve have the public 
confidence and trust 
Much of the violence in African states revolves around ethnic, religious, 
geographic boundary, or other group-identity antagonisms. Rwanda is no 
exception. If a sector (or sectors) of the population believe the enquiry is 
partisan then whatever truth about the past it discovers and reports. 
regardless of whether or not it is true, will not be believed and respected 
by that group of people. Thus. it is particularly important that the GTRRE 
structures represent a wide cross section of society and not be perceived 
as one-sided or oriented to a certain outcome, otherwise, they will be 
considered biased and therefore illegitimate. 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
3.4 Assistance and resources 
A GTRRE process needs financial. training and other support. It must have 
sufficient resources for carrying out its work. Any community that wishes 
to establish a GTRRE must agree to a preparation programme of at least 
three months duration. The government could define the key elements of 
the preparation programme and then accredit NGOs to carry it oU(. This 
would help maintain the independence of the GTRRE from government. 
The content of the programme could include elements such as a descrip-
tion of what the GTRRE will do and what powers it which cases it will 
hear first, what proposals the GTRRE can make to the courts. preparation 
of witnesses, arrangements of prisoners to come to the hearings. and 
ocher matters. After the preparation programme is successfully completed, 
the community would establish its GTRRE. The GTRRE members would 
then need a further short training programme that would also be run by 
the appropriate NGO. In this regard it is important to note that the re-
search by PSMC, the Community Mental Health Care Programme in 
Butare, Rwanda, which has shown that many local people at the cellule 
level and many prisoners have only a very limited understanding of the 
genocide law and of the legal procedures. and that they do not have 
adequate access to radio or written information. 
3.5 Process of the GTRRE 
If the process is not well managed. the danger is that it will open wounds 
without faCilitating healing. It is vital to consider what happens when 
victims go home because many must live alongside perpetrators. The 
process must allow for the victim/perpetrator relationship to be dealt with 
thoroughly. The process of airing the evil done and acknowledging the 
suffering of the victims sparks the catharsis required for reconciliation. 
However. there is a danger that a truth and reconciliation commission can 
do more harm than good and therefore any process must be carefully 
structured and sufficient groundwork laid to prepare a community for 
events and issues that emerge. 
Public hearings should be held, listening to statements from victims' 
family members. additional testimonies. and other reports. The hearings 
should be open to the public so that the Rwandan people can attend and 
experience for themselves that the commission is unbiased in its process. 
Broadcasting hearings over the radio would also help to ensure popular 
awareness and participation in the process." Such open processes will give 
the GTRRE operations the transparency reqUired to achieve legitimacy. 
3.6 Relationship to the criminal justice system 
In order for a GTRRE to maintain its legitimacy. it must be independent of 
the national criminal justice system. However. the proceedings of such a 
commission and criminal prosecutions need not be mutually exclusive. An 
14 However. a concern is thaI Radio Rwanda is government-owned and therefore might 










































PRECONDITIONS AND PROCESSES FOR ESTABLISHING A mc IN RWANDA 
enquiry process may exist where criminal trials are being pursued. In fact. 
such a combination could be tremendously useful, if not necessary. for 
determining the truth and for reconciliation. In isolation. trials allow for 
recognition of only a single version of events.' An enquiry, on the other 
hand. analyses various versions of events and can validate more than one 
version by accepting differing testimony and incorporating all versions 
into a report. Trials can help lead to truth; however, the judicial system 
must always adhere to international human rights norms such as due 
process and assignment of individual, not collective, responsibility. 
In Rwanda. while a GTRRE can work with the criminal justice system, it 
will have to preserve its independence. If it is seen to be simply an arm of 
the criminal justice system, its credibility will be questioned. There are 
various possible ways forward. 
Firstly. the GTRRE could accept confessions from those who are in prison. 
It would then prepare a dossier for each case and the case would be 
back into the criminal justice system where the process could continue. 
Secondly, the GTRRE could be completely separate from the criminal 
justice system and play no part in collecting confessions. It COUld, how-
ever .. playa facilitative role by being a neutral link between the criminal 
justice system and the accused. 
A third option would be for the GTRRE to impose sentences itself. How-
ever. this option would be very controversial and could undermine the 
whole process of reconciliation and may taint the Gacaca structures forever. 
Even if the GTRRE is given the very limited mandate which requires it to 
pass cases back to the criminal process, its role would still be 
valuable. It is probable that individuals would be more willing to take their 
accounts to a legitimate GTRRE structure rather than directly to a govern-
ment prosecutor. In this sense, the GTRRE could act as a facilitator and, in 
effect. is passing a sentence even though the formal sentencing process 
still lies with the criminal justice process, The extent to which the govern-
ment would be willing to give the GTRRE this power would be a matter to 
be negotiated in crafting the commission's mandate. 
The question as to whether the GTRRE has the power to grant restitu-
tion is one that needs to be carefully considered. It might make perpetra-
tors suspicious and unwilling to accept the process. It should also be 
remembered that many of them have few assets and thus expectations 
could be raised which cannot be fulfilled. 
4 CONCLUSION 
If the Rwandan government wishes to adequately address the massive 
human rights violations of the genocide. it must go beyond mere criminal 
trials. Despite the existence of the UN Security Council's war crimes tribunal, 
the immense task of trying all the accused who are within the Rwandan 
system is currently too great for the system to bear. The deficiencies of 
15 See Chayes 1997. Bur see how OSiel (1996) 
comribure to the collective consciousness and 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
the Rwandan judiciary are a major concern. Thus. reliance on the Rwan-
dan judicial system, and to even a lesser the international tribunal, 
to achieve reconciliation and break the country's lengthy cycle of violence 
will prove fruitless. 
Th~ key concern in combating impunity is to develop an objective 
truth' to which all can turn for a reliable assessment of what has oc-
curred.' Unless an independent national process is developed, with 
institution or institutions, which provides the opportunity for victims to tell 
their stories and for those who are guilty of human rights violations to 
confess. Rwandan SOCiety will continue to live under the shadow of divi-
sion, tension. and violence. A credible and legitimate national truth and 
reconciliation commission could address the problems of Rwanda's his-
tory and ongoing crisis. 
The use of the Gacaca institutions can only be an interim measure that 
helps to alleviate the pressure on the courts and the prisons. Rwanda must 
start down the road of a national reconciliation process soon. Unless this 
happens, ethnic violence will continue. A national truth and reconciliation 
commission in its work and in its report should be comprehensive and 
public. Because so many of the Rwandan people are both rural and illiter-
ate, its report should be dealt with in nationwide radio broadcasts, in 
order to reach the widest audience possible. 
This body need not criminal prosecutions or grant amnesties. In 
international law prohibits the granting of amnesty for certain crimes 
that have occurred in Rwanda. However, political and practical consid-
erations, such as resource constraints, must lead to the conclusion that not 
everyone can or should be prosecuted. The commission should instead 
complement other initiatives already under way in Rwanda, serving as a 
forum in which victims can tell of their suffering, be heard and acknowl-
and so regain their dignity. 
16 While one may argue that no such thing exists. the term "objective truth" describes as 
complete and unbiased account of the facts of a situation as pOSSIble. achieved through 
extensive fact-finding by a legitimate. independent body. 
17 See Fellous 1993: 343: "Regardless of the siluation. we all thal the chief priority 
is [0 es[ablish the facts. that is. [0 pursue an investigation. is an Obligation owed 
the victims and their relatives. an obligation owed historical memory and a safeguard 
against forgetting". 
J 8 See Scharf 1996: 41; Bassiouni 1996: 62: Orenticher 1991 (highlighting international 
legal obligations [0 prosecute); Joyner 1996: 127. The Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of GenOCide. adopted 9 December 1948. specifically cre-
ates a duty for state parties to prosecute. Article I obliges the contracting panies to 
"confirm that genOCide is a crime under international law which they undertake to 
prevem and punish" Article IV provides that persons "committing genocide or any of 
the other acts enumerated in Article III shall be punished. whether they are constitu-
tionally responsible rulers. public officials or private individuals". Article V calls on state 
parties to "provide effective penalties". and Article VI provides for trials by "a compe-
tent tribunal" of the state where the act occurred or by an imernational tribunal. See 
also Oremhlicher (2562-2566) "If the punishrnent of (genOCide) was left to the State in 










































PRECONDITIONS AND PROCESSES FOR ESTABLISHING A TRC IN RWANDA 
As important is the contribution a truth and reconciliation commission 
can make towards a process of justice for the future. If it is a legitimate 
and impartial body and if its processes facilitate participation by all, so 
that all Rwandans can discern in its report some acknowledgement of 
their particular truths, then catharsis and reconciliation can be the fruits, 
The ground is then prepared for the prevention of future abuses and the 
need for a culture of human rights becomes part of the official record. 
Additionally, the truth and reconciliation commission's process and rec-
ommendations should attempt to re-establish the rule of law. The best 
way to prevent future human rights abuses is by strengthening the rule of 
law and the corresponding independent judicial institutions and uncor-
rupted governmental bodies. ,e 
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